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Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against




William Owen Dunson of Kansas City, Missouri came home on
the evening of March 27, 1996, to find a phone bill that included $281
in charges for 1-900 phone-sex calls.' When he yelled at his children
and demanded to know who had made the calls, his twelve-year-old
son said Dunson's pregnant daughter might have been responsible. In
a fit of rage, William Dunson slapped his daughter's face, knocking
her against a metal case, hit her leg with a croquet mallet, picked her
up by the shoulders and shoved his knee into her abdomen.2 He then
went to play video games.3 His daughter was just thirteen years old
and seven months pregnant. The fetus was pronounced dead the day
after the beating.4 William Dunson was convicted on December 16,
1996, on numerous counts, including second degree fetal murder.5
The jury recommended a sentence of 103 years.'
On September 12, 1996, Airman Gregory Robbins of Ohio, came
home to the military base housing complex he shared with his wife. 7
He fought with his wife, Karlene, because "one of the couple's dogs
had made a mess in the house and Robbins blamed his wife for the
* B.A., Political Science, U.C. Berkeley. J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the
Law, 1998. I would like to thank the entire CLQ team for its editing efforts. I wish to
dedicate this Note to my family for their love and unwavering support.
1. See Christine Vendel, Death of Fetus is Ruled a Homicide; The Fatal Incident Last
Month Involved Beating of Mother, 13, KANSAS Crry STAR, Apr. 12, 1996, at Cl; See also
Spotlight Story Missouri: Man Convicted of Fetal Murder, 7 AM. POL. NETWORK 104, Dec.
17, 1996.
2. See Vendel, supra note 1, at C1.
3. See id.; see also Spotlight Story Missouri, supra note 1, at 104.
4. See Vendel, supra note 1, at C1.
5. Id.
6. See Spotlight Story Missouri, supra note 1.
7. See Janice H. Morse, Fetal Verdict a First, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Dec. 10, 1996, at
B1; see also State Reports Ohio: Man Faces First Ohio Feticide Trial After Beating of Wife, 7
AM. POL. NETwoRK 144 (Feb. 25, 1997).
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dog's behavior."' He violently battered his wife, who as a result suf-
fered a broken nose, a swollen eye, and a ruptured uterus. Karlene
Robbins was nineteen-years-old at the time of the trial and thirty-four
weeks pregnant. The fetus, which had been healthy and viable (fe-
tuses generally are viable by the twenty-sixth week), died.9 Before
Ohio passed a fetal homicide law in 1996, prosecutors could have
charged Robbins only with assault. However, under the new Ohio
feticide law, the killing or injury of a fetus-except through abor-
tion-is prosecutable for murder, manslaughter or assault.' ° Robbins
pleaded guilty to assault, aggravated assault and involuntary man-
slaughter.11 He was dishonorably discharged from the Air Force and
sentenced to eight years in prison.' 2
Why have Missouri and Ohio, along with approximately half of
the states, enacted fetal homicide (also known as feticide) laws?
Under the common law and many homicide statutes, the intentional
killing of a fetus did not constitute murder because murder requires
live birth. 3 In fact, the law viewed an assault resulting in fetal death
and an assault on a non-pregnant woman as essentially the same
crime. However, the new feticide laws may have the unintended, or
perhaps intended, effect of undermining the right of a woman to an
abortion.
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade'4 established a constitutional right to abortion.' 5 Although the
Court did not "resolve the difficult question of when life begins," it
specifically stated that the Constitution applies the word "person"
only post-natally.' 6 However, some commentators have argued that
unborn children also have a right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happi-
ness because they are members of "our Posterity," for whom the Con-
8. See Morse, supra note 7, at B1.
9. See id.
10. The new feticide statute is now incorporated into the criminal code, OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2903.09 (Anderson 1996).
11. Morse, supra note 7, at B1.
12. See id.
13. See infra notes 27-29.
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. See id. at 153-54.
16. Id. at 158-59. The Constitution does not explicitly define "person." However,
"person" is used in different parts of the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for
Representatives and Senators, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; in the Migration and Importation provision,
Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of the President, Art.
II, § 1, cl. 5, in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, the superceded Fugitive Slave
Clause 3; in the Fifth, Twelfth, Twenty-Second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "[T]he use of the word [person] is such that it has application
only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal
application.... [T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn." Id. at 157-59 (footnote omitted).
stitution specifically provides in the Preamble.17 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court in Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania8 maintains that "viability marks the earliest point at which
the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontheraputic abortions."' 9 Arguably, the Court is
reaffirming the state's interest as protecting fetal life, and not estab-
lishing distinct legal rights for fetuses as "persons."2
Because a fetus is not a person under the Constitution, specifi-
cally for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can be legally and
intentionally destroyed by the woman carrying the fetus, prior to via-
bility, notwithstanding the state interest in maternal health and pro-
tecting potential human life.2 ' Thus, for state legislatures and courts
to declare that it is murder when a person other than the mother kills
that same fetus is arguably inconsistent with Roe. Indeed, some pro-
choice advocates contend that criminal fetal-protection laws create a
double standard for fetal rights and, in turn, come into tension with
the right to an abortion.22 They reason that as the fetus is given more
rights and status as a "person," a woman's right to abort it will be-
come increasingly restrained.'
Fetal murder of a non-viable fetus recognizes that what resides
in the womb is a person.... If we are prosecuting a third party
for killing an unborn child, it's schizophrenic that a woman can
choose an abortion for a child at the same date and we don't call
abortion murder.2 4
However, fetal homicide statutes are not necessarily inconsistent
with a woman's right to an abortion. A defendant who assaults a
pregnant woman and causes the death of her fetus is not similarly situ-
ated with the woman who aborts her fetus.'- The woman has a consti-
tutionally protected right to bodily autonomy, but the third party has
no right to terminate the woman's pregnancy. Moreover, society may
achieve the broader social policy goals of curbing domestic violence
and assault against pregnant women through use of feticide statutes.
Supporters of feticide statutes argue that the focus is not on the fetus,
but rather on the pregnant woman who has been "doubly harmed,
17. See James J. Lynch, Jr., Posterity: A Constitutional Peg for the Unborn, 40 AM. J.
JuRis. 401, 403-04 (1995).
18. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
19. Id. at 860 (reaffirming the central holding of the right to abortion established in
Roe v. Wade).
20. See id.
21. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
22. See Nina Schuyler, Fetal Rights and Wrongs, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1994, at 47-48.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 48 (quoting attorney Anne Kindt, Executive Director of the Right to Life
League of Southern California).
25. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Minn. 1990).
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... [as if] someone had been shot in the foot and in the process lost
some of her toes."26
Part I of this Note will discuss the traditional common law rule of
a live-birth requirement for establishing legal personhood and the ra-
tionale for the recent enactment of feticide statutes. Part II will pro-
vide a broad overview of the different fetal homicide laws that have
been enacted, as well as some that have failed to pass. Part III will
outline the constitutional issues implicated by fetal homicide statutes.
Part IV will briefly address the possible legal and social ramifications
of vesting separate and distinct legal rights to previable fetuses outside
of the criminal context. Finally, Part V will propose a model uniform
feticide statute to address the constitutional and policy concerns.
Part I: The Common Law Born Alive Rule
Under English common law, a child had to be born alive for
homicide laws to apply. Sir Edward Coke enunciated the rule that
emerged in the 17th century:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a
great misprison [i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the
child be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other
cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive.2 7
Thus, if a "quickened"28 fetus was killed, the offense was a "mis-
prison," or misdemeanor. Live birth was required to prove that the
child was alive in the womb at the time the injuries were inflicted. 9
Thus, only a child that was born alive and existed independently of its
mother received protection under homicide laws."
American jurisdictions had adopted the English "born alive" rule
by 1850.1. The primitive state of medicine during the common law
period necessitated the "born alive" rule. First, the medical profes-
sion considered it impossible to determine whether a fetus was capa-
26. Schuyler, supra note 22, at 48 (quoting Christine Littleton, a UCLA law
professor).
27. Sir Edward Coke, THE TmIRD PART OF THE INSTITrrTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 50 (1817).
28. "Quickening" is defined as the fetal movement felt by the mother. It occurs be-
tween the sixteenth and twentieth week of pregnancy. Margaret A. Miller, Intentional Kill-
ing of Viable Fetus Not Murder, 11 N. Ky. L. REv. 213, 215 n.18 (1984).
29. See Katherine Folger, When Does Life Begin... or End? The California Supreme
Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 237, 239 (1994).
30. See id.
31. See Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing-In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A
Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. RFev. 169, 211 (1995).
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ble of independent existence before the baby was born.32 Second,
doctors could not accurately determine the cause of death of a fetus,
thereby destroying the requisite causation element necessary to prove
a murder.33 In other words, a prosecutor could not prove that the
death of the fetus was the result of a defendant's acts unless it was
born alive and then subsequently died of injuries caused by the de-
fendant. Only at birth, when a fetus was considered a person did it
acquire separate legal rights, independent from its mother.34
Although medical science has largely removed the rationale for the
common law rule, today roughly half of the states still follow the tradi-
tional common law "born alive" rule.35
Part H: Fetal Homicide Laws in the United States
Because the "born alive" rule was a consequence of the lack of
sophistication of the medical profession, its erosion naturally came
with advances in medical technology. Doctors can now determine
with relative accuracy the exact stage of fetal development, and thus
whether the fetus died as a result of injuries inflicted by third parties.36
The common law "born alive" rule has thus been legislatively replaced
with fetal homicide statutes in approximately half of the states.37 A
few states have judicially created feticide laws.38 For example, the
highest courts of South Carolina and Massachusetts created feticide
laws pursuant to their power to declare substantive law.39 States en-
acting feticide laws have done so in order to punish violent assaults
against pregnant women and to protect the potential life of the fetus.4"
Some legislators also believe that feticide laws will decrease domestic
violence, drunk driving, and child abuse.4 '
Although states are willing to protect the fetus from third parties,
the degree of protection afforded to a fetus varies from state to state.
32. See Tracy A. Nelson, Taking Roe to the Limits: Treating Viable Feticide as Murder,
17 IND. L. Rlv. 1119, 1122 (1984).
33. See iL
34. See id.
35. See Karen DeCrow, The New Fetal Police: In the Fight Over the Fetus, Recent
Cases Address Whether the State Can Control the Behavior of Expectant Mothers, NAT'L L.
J., Aug. 26, 1991, at 13.
36. See Wendy L. Schoen, Conflict in the Parameters Defining Life and Death in Mis-
souri Statutes, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 555, 562 (1990).
37. Pennsylvania recently passed a feticide bill, becoming the 26th state to adopt feti-
cide legislation. See 1997 Pa. Legis. Serv. 44 (West 1997). See also Frank Reeves, House
Approves Bill to Penalize Killers of Unborn Children, PrTTsBURGH PosT-GAzETrE, Sept.
23, 1997, at B8.
38. See DeCrow, supra note 35.
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., supra note 37.
41. See infra note 103.
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Two commonly required elements of feticide are (1) the termination
of a human pregnancy, and (2) the absence of consent by the pregnant
woman.42 Some states require fetal viability; others do not.
43 Still
others are silent on the question of viability.' This Note will analyze
the feticide statutes according to the fetus' required stages of develop-
ment, whether or not they require knowledge of the fetus and intent
to kill, and the punishment they impose.
A. Fetal Development
1. Viability requirement
At least thirteen states require the fetus to be viable before it can
be considered a homicide victim. 45 Their statutes specify a point in
the pregnancy when the fetus becomes viable. For instance, Iowa's
statute states that "[a]ny person who intentionally terminates a human
pregnancy,... after the end of the second trimester of the pregnancy
where death of the fetus results commits the crime of feticide. '46 Via-
bility normally occurs between twenty-six and twenty-nine weeks ges-
tation (at six to seven months), when the fetus has developed lungs
that are capable of breathing air.47 The states with viability require-
ments (including Iowa, New York, South Carolina, and Massachu-
setts) arguably adhere most closely to the Roe rationale, namely, that
a fetus cannot be considered to have human qualities until it can sur-
vive independently outside of its mother's womb.48
A number of states with viability requirements punish fetal homi-
cide as manslaughter.4 9 Under Georgia's feticide law, feticide is pun-
ishable by life imprisonment, as is murder." In the case of Louisiana,
42. See discussion infra Parts II, A-B.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See generally DeCrow, supra note 35.
46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West Supp. 1997). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00
(McKinney 1996) (defining homicide as including the killing of a "person or an unborn
child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks"); State v.
Home, 282 S.C. 444, 447 (1984) (creating a feticide law judicially instead of legislatively,
using the state's highest court pursuant to its common law power to declare substantive
criminal law, granted specifically by statute); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378,
383-84 (1989) (rejecting the born alive rule in a murder case but not taking a position on
the viability of the fetus).
47. See Schoen, supra note 36, at 565.
48. "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
49. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1996), MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.322 (West 1996), Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1996), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5
(1995).
50. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1996).
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if a person kills an "unborn child" intentionally or during the commis-
sion of listed felonies, then it is considered "first degree feticide," with
a maximum penalty of fifteen years in prison. 1
2. "Quickness" requirement
The "quickness" requirement is a remnant of the common law
concept that a child achieves "animation" or a soul when it first
moves. 2 "Animation" was defined as "the infusion of a rational soul
into the developing fetus," occurring some time between conception
and birth.53 Prior to this "quickening," or first fetal movement, the
fetus was considered to be a part of the mother. 4 Presumably, states
that have retained the quickness requirement reason that prior to the
first movement of the fetus, a fetus has no life of its own, and thus
cannot be considered an individual for purposes of being a homicide
victim.5
5
Approximately eight states have criminalized the killing of an
"unborn quick child."5 6 "Quickening," currently defined as the first
sign of fetal movement felt by the mother, usually occurs between the
sixteenth and twentieth weeks of pregnancy.57 Seven of the eight
states do not define "quick" in their feticide statutes. 58 Rhode Island
alone defines "quick" as synonymous with viable.59
3. No viability requirement
States more solicitous of fetal life have eliminated fetal viability
requirements altogether. Their legislatures have declared that the
killing of "a product of conception" is a criminal offense regardless of
its gestational age. In certain states, this reasoning applies to zy-
gotes°--before the embryo has become a fetus. 61 There, a person can
51. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (West 1996). See also S.D. COD=ED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-17-6 (1996), N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 subd. (1)(c) (1996). In South Dakota, a
person is subject to 10 years imprisonment with a possible fine of $10,000 if a person "in-
tentionally kills a human fetus by causing injury to its mother." S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-6-1 (1996). In New Hampshire, if a person "purposefully or knowingly causes injury
to another resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth" it is first degree assault, with imprison-
ment of not more than 15 years and a possible fine not greater than $4000. N.H. Rlv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 651.2(II)(a), 651.2 (IV)(a) (1996).




56. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 621 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. See Schoen, supra note 36, at 565.
58. Davis, 872 P.2d at 621 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
59. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5(c) (1995).
60. A zygote is the result of a sperm uniting with an ovum to form a single cell. See
Schoen, supra note 36, at 563.
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be criminally liable for destroying a mass of fertilized cells, even
before the embryo has developed any discernible human organs. In
Arizona, for example, the killing of an unborn child by injury to its
mother is incorporated into the crime of manslaughter, without re-
quiring that the fetus be viable.62 In Illinois, the crime is termed "the
intentional homicide of an unborn child" and applies at any time from
fertilization until birth.63
Where viability is not a requirement, application of feticide stat-
utes tracks not the life of the fetus, but the harm inflicted on the preg-
nant woman. For instance, Arizona groups the fetal homicide law
with its manslaughter statutes and presumes culpability on injury to
the mother of the fetus. 64 In contrast, Illinois requires that the de-
fendant have knowledge of the woman's pregnant state.
65
4. Statutes facially silent on issue of viability
There are at least six states that proscribe the criminal killing of a
fetus, but are silent on the issue of viability.6 6 Some of these states
require knowing intent to cause the death of the fetus.67 Others pro-
hibit feticide in the commission of listed felonies as part of their fel-
ony-murder statutes.68 According to the dissent in Davis, California
currently has the harshest fetal homicide law in the nation after the
California Supreme Court handed down its decision interpreting Cali-
fornia's murder statute in that case.69 In 1970, the California Legisla-
ture had added the term "fetus" to its murder statute, which provides
that "murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought. ' 70 The Davis court held that the statute had no
61. See, e.g., ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2(3)(b) (West 1996), MNN. STAT.
AiNN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661 (West 1996).
62. See ARIz. REv. STAT. Ar. § 13-1103 A.5. (West Supp. 1994). Arkansas and New
Mexico have similar statutes. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-13-201, 54401 (Michie 1995),
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-7, 31-18-15 (Michie 1996). When a person inflicts an injury on a
pregnant woman in the commission of a felony that results in a miscarriage or stillbirth, it
is first degree battery. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-201, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7. In
Arkansas, the punishment is no greater than twenty years imprisonment. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-401. In New Mexico, it is punishable by three years imprisonment with a possi-
ble fine of $5,000. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.
63. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 subd. (b)(a)(3) (West 1996).
64. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 A.5. (West Supp. 1994).
65. See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 519-1.2(3) (West 1996).
66. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
67. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201, subd. (1)(a) (Michie Supp. 1997). See
also Ir. CODE ANN. § 35-42-6 (West 1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 631-1(1)(c) (1995).
68. See generally LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (West 1996). See also S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 22-16-1.1(c) (Michie 1996).
69. 872 P.2d at 621.
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1998) (amended by 1970 Cal. Stats. Ch.
1311, § 1 at 2440).
viability requirement.71 The court based its decision based on the
state's interest in protecting potential life, unhampered by a woman's
constitutional privacy interest as in the case of therapeutic abortions.
72
Additionally, the dissent in Davis pointed out that the majority's
interpretation of California Penal Code section 187(a) does not re-
quire that the defendant know of the existence of the fetus or intend
to kill it.73 In other words, the dissent's argument is that in California,
a person can be prosecuted for the murder of a nonviable fetus even if
the person did not know that the woman was pregnant. California is
thus the only state in the United States where causing the death of a
nonviable fetus that the actor neither knew or had reason to know
existed can constitute a capital offense.74
B. Intent! Knowledge Requirement
Some states require that the defendant knew about the fetus and
intentionally caused its demise before the defendant is charged with
the crime of killing a fetus. For example, Nevada has enacted a law
that states that the act of killing a fetus is criminal if "[a] per-
son... willfully kills an unborn quick child, by any injury committed
upon the mother of the child."'75 Other states, such as Florida, have
placed some restrictions on the crime, stating that the act is criminal
only if the unborn child is killed "by any injury to the mother of such
child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such
mother. ' 76 A handful of states require that the offender must know
that the woman was pregnant, in which case the crime is treated as
first degree murder, but the death penalty would not apply.77 In Min-
nesota, the crime attaches if there is premeditation or the act is com-
mitted "with intent to effect death of the unborn child or another" or
71. See 872 P.2d at 599.
72. See id. at 597.
73. See id. at 616.
74. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 615. Only first degree murder carries the death penalty, and
it usually requires malice aforethought. In the felony-murder context (for example, a
death that occurred in the course of a robbery), malice is implied. Other states require
either fetal viability, intent/knowledge, or otherwise limit the punishment for a feticide
conviction. See generally discussion Parts II, A-B.
75. NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.210 (1995). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West
1996), WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 1996).
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1996). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1996),
Mic. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.322 (West 1996), Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1996), R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-23-5 (1995).
77. See Ill Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2, subd. (b)(a)(3) (1996). MANN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.266, 609.2661 (West 1996), N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 112.1-17.1-01, 12.1-17.0-1-02, 12.1-
32-01 (1996). In Minnesota and North Dakota, the crime of the "murder of an unborn
child," where "unborn child" is defined as one that is "conceived, but not yet born," is also
treated as first degree murder. Id.
Svrin2 19981 FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS
466 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:457
while in the commission of certain enumerated felonies.7  In Utah,
feticide is a capital offense only if the actor caused the death of the
unborn child "intentionally or knowingly."79 This rule applies even in
a felony-murder situation. 0 Otherwise, the punishment is at least five
years imprisonment."' In Indiana and Louisiana, the crime is called
"feticide" where a person "knowingly or intentionally" terminates the
pregnancy of another.8 2
C. An Analysis of the Various Fetal Homicide Laws
Given this general overview of the different fetal homicide laws
on the books in the several states, what are the attributes and flaws of
these statutes?
The states that require viability argue that it is dictated by the
logic of Roe. In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that a
woman had a constitutional right to abortion.83 At issue was a Texas
statute that prohibited unmarried pregnant women from getting abor-
tions, with the state of Texas arguing that its statute's goal was to pro-
tect fetal life.84 Based on the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court ruled that a woman's right to personal privacy
encompassed the right to abort her nonviable fetus.8 5 It also estab-
lished the controversial trimester framework for legal abortions,8 6
which was later set aside in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey. 7 Unlike the trimester framework, however, the
distinction drawn in Roe between viable and non-viable fetuses re-
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 1996). Similarly, in North Dakota, if the un-
born child is killed with express or implied malice or is killed in the commission of certain
serious listed felonies, the crime also fits under the murder statute. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.1-17.1-01, 12.1-17.0-1-02, 12.1-32-01 (1996). In both states the maximum penalty is
life imprisonment. MNmN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-
17.1-02, 12.1-32-01 (1996).
79. See UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-201, subd. (1)(a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
80. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202, 76-5-203 (Michie Supp. 1997).
81. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Michie Supp. 1997).
82. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (West 1996), LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6
(West 1996). In Indiana, the punishment is four years imprisonment, with a possible fine of
no greater than $10,000. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-6 (West 1996). The Indiana Legis-
lature passed a bill over Governor O'Bannon's veto to create stiffer penalties for feticide.
Intentional killing of a viable fetus is now a Class A felony. Killing of a fetus during a
crime involving aggravated battery carries a stronger penalty. See Legislative Briefs: Sen-
ate Votes to Override Veto, CouRmR-J., Jan. 23, 1998, at B4.
83. See 410 U.S. at 154.
84. See id. at 150.
85. See id. at 152-53.
86. See idL at 164-65.
87. 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
mains.88 In the first trimester, the state cannot regulate abortion.89 In
the second, it can only regulate to protect the mother's health.90 In
the third trimester, however, after the fetus becomes "viable," 91 the
state may proscribe abortions unless necessary to save the woman's
life or health.92 Put differently, viability is the point at which the
state's interest in the fetus becomes compelling. Only then is a fetus
capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb," and state in-
terference after viability has both "logical and biological
justifications.
'9 3
States with viability requirements for feticide laws are arguably
most consistent with the constitutional significance of viability, as
enunciated in Roe and remains relevant even after Casey. If a fetus
obtains legal protection at viability, it is logical to conclude that this
bright line applies in the criminal context as well. After all, it hardly
seems fair for a pregnant woman to be allowed to abort her fetus le-
gally prior to fetal viability and yet punish a third party who does es-
sentially the same thing. This would give the fetus a different right to
life depending on who attempted, or succeeded in, ending it. Lack of
an intent requirement can accentuate this apparent inequity, for the
pregnant woman who aborts intentionally terminates the life of the
fetus, whereas a third party may have killed the fetus unintentionally
or even accidentally (as in a vehicular manslaughter situation).
States that do not impose a viability requirement counter that
abortion and criminal assault on a pregnant woman are different, and
that comparison between them is irrelevant and unpersuasive.94 With
legalized abortion, the state must consider two competing constitu-
tional interests: the privacy and liberty rights of the pregnant woman
and the state's interest in protecting potential life.95 There are no sim-
ilar conflicting interests where a third party criminally attacks a preg-
nant woman; only the pregnant woman should control the destiny of
the fetus, as she alone is carrying it to term and giving it life.96 In
addition, these states note that Casey diminished the importance of
88. "[The divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the valid-
ity of Roe's central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the State's
interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeu-
tic abortions." See id. at 860.
89. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
90. See id. at 164.
91. The Roe Court defined "viability" as the point when the fetus is capable of sus-
taining existence outside the mother's womb. See id. at 164-65.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 163.
94. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598.
95. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
96. See Wayne Johnson, Feticide Law Avenges Choice, Not Lives, inmsTLAN LEGAL
Sci. Q., Fall 1994, at 12.
SDrine 19981 FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS
468 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:457
viability. The Casey Court held that "the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting ... the life of the fetus"
such that abortions can be regulated even prior to viability so long as
this does not cause an "undue burden" on the woman seeking an
abortion. 97 Otherwise, the state can protect potential life at all stages
of pregnancy.
98
Ultimately, although the viability requirement fits within the
abortion rights jurisprudence, it is not necessary due to the reduced
importance of viability after Casey, the right of the woman to be free
from violence, and the lack of any competing right in the attacker.
Moreover, not requiring viability does not necessarily create enhanced
rights in the fetus. Indeed, feticide laws may actually reinforce the
right to abortion in that they protect the procreative choice of the
woman to carry her fetus to term.99
As opposed to states that enact feticide laws with or without a
viability requirement, states that require that the criminal actor have
knowledge of the existence of the fetus and intent to cause its demise
contend that this requirement is more fair because it would be pa-
tently unjust to punish someone who attacked an "invisible" victim.' 0
Since a large part of criminal law is premised on mens rea, or criminal
intent, it goes against our notions of fundamental fairness to punish
someone for the death of a fetus he neither knew or had reason to
know existed.'0 1
D. Current and Pending Legislation
There is a growing trend for states to give the fetus greater pro-
tection under criminal statutes,0 2 perhaps in part because domestic
violence has reached our national consciousness in recent years, and
feticide laws serve as a weapon to combat violence against women.
03
A wide variety of laws have been enacted, and a number of state legis-
latures are currently debating the passage of new or amended fetal
homicide laws, though concerns about the potential conflict with le-
97. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
98. See id. at 877.
99. The California Supreme Court in Davis stated that "the state's interest extends
beyond the protection of human life. The state has an interest in punishing violent conduct
that deprives a pregnant woman of her procreative choice." 872 P.2d at 603 (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
100. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 615 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
101. See id.
102. See supra Parts II, A-B.
103. Attaching feticide amendments onto domestic violence bills, as in the cases of Wis-
consin and Kentucky, suggests that perhaps legislators see feticide as occurring primarily in
domestic abuse situations, which is in fact often the case. See James K. Ribe et aT., Blows to
the Maternal Abdomen Causing Fetal Demise: Report of Three Cases and a Review of the
Literature, J. FORENSIC SCL, Sept. 1993, at 1092, 1092-96.
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galized abortion remain. °4
In February 1995, a proposed bill would have changed Tennes-
see's existing feticide law, which requires viability,10 5 to allow for mur-
der charges where the embryo had a heartbeat, which occurs well
before viability, within three to six weeks after conception.' 06 The bill
failed to pass. 107 In 1997, the Wisconsin Assembly passed a feticide
bill as part of its omnibus domestic violence legislation bill in 1997.108
The statute sets strict penalties for batterers who assault and kill wo-
men, with even stricter penalties if the woman is pregnant, and both
she and her fetus die. 0 9 The statute explicitly does not criminalize
abortion." 0 In 1996, Ohio passed a comprehensive feticide law that is
now incorporated into its murder, manslaughter, and assault stat-
utes."' And the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a similarly compre-
hensive feticide law in September 1997, which Governor Ridge has
signed into law." 2
In contrast, two states, Virginia and Kentucky, have failed to pass
fetal homicide bills in recent years. Although Virginia's bill was
aimed only at viable fetuses, the legislation became hopelessly entan-
gled in the abortion debate." 3 In Kentucky, the legislature passed a
domestic violence bill but did not pass the attached feticide
amendment."
4
Certain states are still reluctant to pass fetal homicide laws." 5
Half of the states even maintain the antiquated born alive rule,
1 6
which no longer has any significance given modern medical technol-
104. See, e.g., Lawmakers in Three States to Propose Abortion Legislation, WLN, Jan.
10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14261.
105. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1997).
106. See Richard Locker, Church Conservatives Study Political Strategy, THE CoMMR-
CIAL APPEAL, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al.
107. See id.
108. See Sharon Thelmer, Fetal Homicide Bill Clears Assembly, Assoc. PRESS POL.
SERv., June 11, 1997, available in 1997 WLN 2532146.
109. See David Callender, Anti-Crime Bill on Fetuses Expected to Pass, CAP. TImEs,
June 24, 1995, at A8 (hereinafter Callender, Anti-Crime Bill); see also David Callender,
Reps Want Hurting Fetus to be Crime, CAP. TIMEs, June 29, 1995, at A3 (hereinafter Cal-
lender, Reps Want Hurting Fetus).
110. See Callender, Reps Want Hurting Fetus, supra note 109, at A3.
111. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.02, 2903.04 (Anderson 1996).
112. See Ridge to Sign Fetal Homicide Bill, INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 23, 1997, at A2. See
also 1997 Pa. Legis. Serv. 44 (West 1997).
113. See Ellen Nakashima, VA Debates Law on Fetal Homicide; Legislation Entangled
With Abortion Issue, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1996, at Dl. See also Spencer S. Hsu, Fetal
Homicide Measure Falls in Virginia House; Parental Notification on Abortions Also Re-
jected, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at B4.
114. See Richard Wilson, Domestic-Violence Bill Approved in Senate With No Amend-
ments, CoutiER-J., Mar. 23, 1996, at A8.
115. See generally Nakashima, supra note 113 and Wilson, supra note 114.
116. See DeCrow, supra note 35, at 13.
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ogy.n 7 Policy concerns, coupled with constitutional constraints, have
made some state legislators and courts wary of giving fetuses greater
protection in criminal statutes." 8
Part I: Constitutional Implications and Public Policy Issues
Critics of fetal homicide laws view them as undermining abortion
rights, as giving the fetus a legal status it does not now have." 9 If we
are to declare a nonviable fetus a "person" for purposes of criminal
statutes, then presumably fetuses have a right to life under the Four-
teenth Amendment, since no State can deprive "any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 20 Abortion rights
advocates fear that recognizing a fetus as a person in one context
(criminal law) will naturally entail recognizing it as a person in the
abortion context as well.' 21
On the other hand, supporters of feticide laws argue that the laws
avenge choice, not lives.'22 In the wake of Davis, Wayne Johnson ad-
dressed Justice Mosk's argument that the decision, read in conjunction
with California's permissive abortion statutes, rendered a "distorted
view of fetal life:"'"
Why should society punish someone who kills a fetus against the
mother's will? To ask the question is to answer it: because it is
against the mother's will. That is, the protected interest is the
mother's will, not the life of the fetus.... [Feticide laws] simply
preserve the right of a pregnant woman to control the outcome
of her pregnancy.... It protects pregnancy termination preroga-
tives.... By giving one individual the right to unilaterally end
the existence of another human being (fetus or child) for any
reason, we cannot say that the latter has any independent
value.' 24
This argument is not entirely satisfactory, however, because
although it is persuasive to argue that feticide statutes reinforce a wo-
man's choice whether to carry her pregnancy to term, the fact remains
that feticide statutes are generally criminal homicide statutes. The
state prosecutes the defendant for ending the life of the fetus, not de-
priving a woman of her procreative choice. The state has also been
described as vindicating the rights of potential life, not a woman's
117. See Schuyler, supra note 22, at 48-49.
118. See generally Nakashima, supra note 113; Wilson, supra note 114.
119. See id.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. See Callender, Anti-Crime Bill, supra note 109, at A8.
122. See Johnson, supra note 96, at 12.
123. Id.
124. Id.
choice.125 Therefore, the troubling possibility remains, then, that de-
fining a fetus as a person may infringe on the right to abortion.
A. Equal Protection
In State v. Merrill,2 6 the Minnesota Supreme Court encountered
an equal protection challenge to the state's 1988 feticide statute. 127 In
Merrill, pregnant victim Gail Anderson died from gunshot wounds al-
legedly inflicted by the defendant Sean Merrill."z Ms. Anderson was
carrying a twenty-seven or twenty-eight day old embryo that had yet
to reach the fetal stage of development. 2 9 The coroner concluded
that the embryo died due to the death of Anderson, as it was not
viable. 3 ° It was unclear whether either Anderson or Merrill knew of
Anderson's pregnancy when she was assaulted. 3 '
The defendant in Merrill challenged the feticide statute on both
equal protection and due process grounds. He claimed that he was
unfairly treated under Minnesota's feticide statute, which exposed him
to "serious penal consequences while others who intentionally termi-
nate a nonviable fetus or embryo," namely, the mother and her doc-
tor, are not subject to criminal sanctions.' 32 In other words, similarly
situated persons, i.e., those that terminate the life of the fetus, are not
treated similarly.133 Pregnant women and their doctors can systemati-
cally abort fetuses while third parties are criminally prosecuted.
34
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Merrill's equal protec-
tion argument, reasoning that a third party attacker is not similarly
situated with a pregnant woman and does not have the same constitu-
tional rights with respect to the fetus. 35 A pregnant woman has a
liberty and privacy interest in bodily autonomy and procreative
choice.' 36 The third party attacker, on the other hand, has no right to
take that choice from the woman, nor does the state have any interest
in protecting a third party who has harmed another person's fetus. 37
Supreme Court jurisprudence "does not hold that the state has no le-
gitimate interest in protecting the fetus until viability.... [Rather, it]
125. See, e.g., Davis, 872 P.2d at 599.






132. Id. at 321.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 321-22. The Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling is based on two questions
certified to the court by the lower appellate court. See idt at 320.
136. See id. at 322.
137. See id. See also Davis, 872 P.2d at 597.
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forbids the state's protection of the unborn's interests only when these
interests conflict with the constitutional rights of the prospective par-
ent." '138 In situations where there is no conflict, the state has an inter-
est in protecting potential life, and thus, to punish those that terminate
that potential life.'3 9 Further, even if Ms. Anderson had intended to
have an abortion, the defendant still has no right to kill her fetus, for a
criminal statute should not turn on the fortuitous intent of the victim.
B. Due Process
As for the due process challenge in Merrill, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the defendant could be criminally convicted
of killing a one-month old embryo not yet at the fetal stage.140 Like
other state courts, the court rejected his fair warning argument and
used the doctrine of "transferred intent,' 141 i.e., if the defendant
meant to harm the mother, his intent to harm could be transferred to
her one month old embryo. 42
In states that do not require intent to kill or injure the fetus or
knowledge that the woman is pregnant, however, feticide statutes may
in fact run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause.
If a defendant does not know the female victim is pregnant, for in-
stance, the defendant has no warning of criminal liability for killing an
invisible, non-viable fetus. In general, a law must give sufficient warn-
ing of prohibited behavior so that individuals may conduct themselves
accordingly.143 Critics of fetal homicide legislation therefore argue
that a feticide statute with an indeterminate causation standard or
without a meaningful intent requirement violates the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to vagueness and over-
breadth, permitting the conviction of innocent people who have not
engaged in criminal activity.
144
This view played some part in Davis, where the defendant tried to
rob a woman emerging from a check cashing store. When she re-
sisted, he shot her in the chest area.' 45 She was five months pregnant
and had a miscarriage due to the gunshot wound and loss of blood. 46
138. Davis, 872 P.2d at 597.
139. See id.
140. See Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323-24.
141. Id. at 323.
142. See id.
143. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975).
144. See Mark S. Kende, Michigan's Proposed Prenatal Protection Act: Undermining a
Woman's Right to an Abortion, 5 J. GENDER & L. 247, 257-59 (1996). Broad feticide laws
with no intent requirement resemble strict liability criminal statutes because it is irrelevant
whether the wrongdoer knows if a woman is pregnant. See id. at 259.
145. See id.
146. See id.
The defendant claimed that he did not know that the woman was
pregnant because she was overweight and that he had no intent to kill
the fetus, as he had no knowledge of its existence. 47 In his dissent,
Justice Mosk reasoned that to hold Davis criminally responsible for
conduct that he could not reasonably anticipate would violate his right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 The California
Supreme Court rejected this argument, but the court conceded that
although a person could be criminally charged for murder of a non-
viable fetus, previous Courts of Appeals decisions had required viabil-
ity, and their reading had expanded the scope of the statute to such an
extent that it would be unjust to apply it to Davis ex post facto. 49
Due process concerns are also raised by the inherent difficulties
with proving causation in alleged feticides. It has been argued that
nonviable fetuses do not resemble human beings and are therefore
unreasonably deemed murder victims. 5 ° Justice Mosk argued against
enactment of feticide laws because the life of the nonviable fetus is
very fragile.' 5 ' At seven weeks, the fetus is roughly the "size and
weight of a peanut."' 52 Justice Mosk described a fetus of this age as
"[a] being so alien to what we know to be human beings seems hardly
worth being made the subject of murder."'53 Furthermore, scientific
studies have indicated that many women have miscarriages, or "spon-
taneous abortions,"'54 in the first trimester of pregnancy, due to a va-
riety of factors, including "genetic or developmental defects in the
fetus, uterine abnormalities, maternal trauma, illness, or substance
abuse, toxins in the fetal or maternal environment, etc. '55 Moreover,
miscarriages occur much more frequently than is generally assumed,
i.e., in at least 15% to 20% of all pregnancies, with substantial num-
bers "unreported or are very early and subclinical; some have esti-
mated the true incidence to be as high as 50% to 78% [of all
pregnancies].' 56 The natural fragility of the fetus makes it difficult to
show causation.
147. The mother, Maria Flores, was 5 feet 1 inch tall, but weighed 191 pounds. Based
on these dimensions, the perinatologist Thomas Moore testified that it was "'not likely'
that on the date of the shooting a woman of Flores' stature would have showed her preg-
nancy when clothed and standing upright." See 872 P.2d at 615 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 600.
150. See 872 P.2d at 614-15 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 620.
152. Id. at 614.
153. Id. at 615 (quoting from Comment, Is the Intentional Killing of an Unborn Child
Homicide?, 2 PAC. L.J. 170, 185 (1970)).
154. See id. at 620.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The issue will be particularly difficult in instances where the mis-
carriage does not occur until several hours or days after the mother
has contact with the defendant, since natural complications could have
intervened. 57
Such a showing, however, is a significant factor in proving that
the defendant, and not some other unrelated factor, caused the death
of a very immature fetus. Without proof of causation beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the conviction fails to satisfy due process.
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment proscribes any "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" for a criminal offense." 8 Judges and scholars hostile to fetal
homicide statutes have therefore pointed out that where feticide con-
stitutes murder, it could qualify as the "murder" for felony-murder
purposes and result in a punishment of life without the possibility of
parole or even death, an arguably disproportionate punishment for
the crime. 159 In some states with the felony-murder rule, it is not nec-
essary that the fetus be the target of the underlying felony.' 61 Some
fetal homicide statutes make no distinction between an intentional,
unintentional or accidental killing of the fetus. 6' Justice Mosk in his
Davis dissent regarded the application of the felony-murder rule,
where the murder victim is a fetus, as a "draconian" interpretation of
the law.'6 The felony-murder rule applies to a variety of unintended
homicides resulting from
reckless behavior, or ordinary negligence, or pure accident; it
embraces both calculated conduct and acts committed in panic
or rage, or under the dominion of mental illness, drugs, or alco-
hol; and it condemns alike consequences that are highly prob-
able, conceivably possible, or wholly unforeseeable.1
3
The defendant's state of mind with respect to the homicide is thus
entirely irrelevant. In Justice Mosk's hypothetical,
an unarmed 18-year-old with no criminal record enters a store
during business hours, intending to shoplift a can of spray paint;
when a security guard accosts him, his nerve fails and he bolts
for the door; in his haste he accidentally knocks a woman shop-
per to the floor; unknown to anyone the woman is 7 weeks preg-
nant, and the trauma of the fall causes her to miscarry.'
64
157. See id. at 258.
158. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII, § 1.
159. See 872 P.2d at 617-18 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 837.
162. See 872 P.2d at 618 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 619 (quoting People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 719 (1983)).
164. Id.
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Of course, this hypothetical goes to the extremes of the felony-
murder rule as applied in a fetal homicide context, and the felony-
murder rule is controversial even without the added dimension of
making a fetus the subject of the murder. If criminal intent does in-
deed lie at the base of our criminal justice system, then a rule with
such harsh consequences will be resisted when the defendant neither
intended to kill the fetus nor knew of its existence.
D. State's Interests
In both the due process and the equal protection analysis, the
state's interest is weighed against the interest of the individual.16
Therefore, it is critical to determine exactly what state interests are
served by fetal homicide laws. While some critics of feticide laws have
regarded them as back-door attempts to undercut a woman's right to
abortion by enhancing the rights of the fetus, supporters of feticide
statutes have vehemently maintained that these laws address other im-
portant state objectives, such as honoring a woman's procreative
choice and curbing domestic violence and drunk driving.16 6 They ar-
gue that without the competing privacy concerns of the woman in-
volved in the abortion context, the state has the unhindered interest of
protecting potential human life and future citizens. 67 They argue that
feticide laws actually preserve the pregnant woman's reproductive
choice. 16 In a criminal assault context, a third party engages in con-
duct whereby a wanted pregnancy is terminated. While abortion is
still a nationally divisive issue, it is difficult to dispute the fact that a
third party has no constitutionally protected interest to kill someone
else's unborn child.
1 6 9
Finally, some feticide statutes have been passed as part of a gen-
eral scheme to combat domestic violence and drunk driving. 7 ° In-
creasingly state legislatures are amending domestic violence bills with
fetal homicide laws, for very often, the party who kills the fetus is not
a street mugger, but an ex-boyfriend, husband, or enraged father.'
7 1
Likewise, as drunk driving is increasingly condemned in our soci-
ety, legislators have made vehicular homicide statutes stiffer by tack-
165. See supra discussion in Parts III, A-B.
166. See Thelmer, supra note 108; Richard E. Schroeder, Society Must Punish Drunk
Drivers, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 1996, at C14.
167. See Johnson, supra note 96, at 12.
168. See id.
169. See Joy Powell, Homicide Law Doesn't Cover Fetus in Crash, OMAHA WoRLD-
HERALD, Feb. 20, 1997, at 1. See also Davis, 872 P.2d at 597.
170. See generally Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1997).
171. See Vendel, supra note 1, at C1. See also Petula Dvorak, Boyfriend Arrested in
Woman's Killing, NEw ORLEANS TIMEs-PIcAYUNE, Feb. 8, 1997, at B3.
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ing fetal homicide provisions onto them.172 Courts, in turn, have been
readily receptive to making a fetus a victim of vehicular homicide. 73
For example, on October 21, 1996, Frank Flores Cuellar was found
guilty of manslaughter in the death of Krystal Zuniga, whose mother
was seven and a half months pregnant at the time of the car crash. 74
He was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. 75
E. The Mother's Interest
Another difficult question arises when an expectant mother ter-
minates the life of the fetus other than by legal abortion. For instance,
a woman may ingest fatal drugs or consume a large quantity of alco-
hol, or more directly, shoot herself in the stomach. 76 In 1996, a Wis-
consin trial judge approved a district attorney's request to give the
state custody of an eight-month-old fetus. 1 77 The fetus' twenty-three
year-old pregnant mother was a crack addict who refused to stop
smoking the drug during her pregnancy and was ordered hospitalized
until after the birth of her child.1 78 Her baby was born healthy, but
the woman continued to challenge the court's decision.' 79 In 1997, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that "the state had acted wrongfully
in taking custody of a fetus by detaining a pregnant woman who was
using drugs,... [because] a fetus is not a child under the state's wel-
fare laws. . . ."180
Should a pregnant woman get more lenient treatment than a
third party, or perhaps, no punishment at all, simply because it is her
fetus nestling within her womb? Many courts have answered in the
negative. For example, a Florida appellate court affirmed a man-
slaughter conviction against Kawana Ashley who in 1994 shot herself
in the stomach while in the third trimester of her pregnancy.'" The
shooting caused the baby's premature birth and subsequent death fif-
172. See Schroeder, supra note 166 at C14. See also Powell, supra note 169, at 1.
173. See, e.g., Teenager Indicted for Murder of Fetus, NATION, Oct. 6, 1995, at A7. See
also State Reports Ohio: Man Charged With Vehicular Homicide in Fetal Death, 7 AM. POL.
NETwORK 116 (Jan. 14, 1997).
174. See Man Gets 16 Years for Death of Premature Baby Delivered After Crash, DE-
TROr NEws, Oct. 22, 1996, at 5A.
175. See id. See also State Reports Ohio, supra note 173.
176. See Stephanie Stone, Court Affirms Manslaughter Conviction of Expectant Mom
Who Shot Herself in Stomach, WLN, Mar. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2642.




180. Tamar Lewin, Detention of Pregnant Woman for Drug Use is Struck Down, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at A16.
181. See id. See also Stephanie Stone, Court Affirms Manslaughter Conviction of Ex-
pectant Mom Who Shot Herself in Stomach, Mar. 29, 1996, available in 1998 WLN 2642.
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teen days later.18 2 In another case, nineteen-year-old Ayana Landon,
desperate to end her pregnancy, illegally obtained and ingested a drug
she knew could cause a miscarriage. 83 She sat on a toilet and gave
birth to a one-pound, seven-ounce boy, watched his body wriggle, and
then closed the lid. 84 "IT]he infant, whose viability was doubtful, was
born alive but drowned. Landon was charged with homicide and
awaits trial. .. ."18
The foregoing cases of maternal-induced fetal homicide are
deeply unsettling, legally as well as emotionally. Assuming that the
fetuses were not viable, both women could have gotten a legal abor-
tion at a clinic based on their constitutional right.'86 Yet they are
charged with criminal fetal homicide for killing their fetuses by a non-
state approved method. In effect, abortion becomes murder based
simply on the means employed to reach the exact same end.
Not surprisingly then, many advocates of women's rights vehe-
mently oppose expanding the fetus' rights fearing the measures in-
tended to protect pregnant women could be used against them,
exposing those who are alcoholics or drug addicts to prosecution and
ultimately abolishing any right to abortion. 87 It is still too soon, how-
ever, to tell how the courts will answer the inevitable challenge by
some women that their convictions infringe upon their right to abor-
tion. Courts may very well decide that although a woman has a right
to abort her previable fetus, she must do it in a safe and sanitary man-
ner prescribed by the state.
After all, by regulating abortion, the state attempts in part to pre-
vent "botched" abortions that may leave children alive but seriously
impaired. Take, for instance, the case of Brenda Drummond, a Cana-
dian woman who attempted to kill her child by inserting the muzzle of
an air rifle inside herself and shooting the baby she had carried for
nine months.'88 Baby Jonathan was born in Drummond's bathroom
and rushed to a hospital where doctors operated to remove the projec-
tile.189 At seven months, he appeared to be in good health, but doc-
tors said it was too soon to tell if he sustained brain damage through
his mother's actions.'90 In other cases-of maternal drug abuse or ne-
glect-the fetus may not die, but may be born a "crack baby," for
182. See id.
183. See Delsite, supra note 177, at Fl.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See supra Introduction.
187. See iL
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example, with serious disorders. Thus, although a pregnant woman
has a right to bodily autonomy, she presumably does not have a right
to mutilate her child in utero. Even if she successfully terminates her
pregnancy, the state still has a general interest in her and her child's
health and safety.
Part IV: Other Social/Legal Implications
Aside from criminal fetal homicide laws, the fetus is gaining legal
rights in other areas as well. For example, a number of states have
given even non-viable fetuses legal status as beings to be compensated
for in wrongful death actions.' 9' Also, feticide laws may have implica-
tions in unexpected areas. Selective reduction, for instance, is a medi-
cal practice of killing one or more fetuses, but not all, of a multiple
pregnancy when a woman has elected in-vitro fertilization. 92 Doctors
systematically and routinely kill off multiple fetuses in this clinical
context, since multiple pregnancy increases the health and sometimes
life risks for the mother and often produces weaker babies. 93 Admit-
tedly, the reasons involved in selective reduction are medical, and not
moral in nature, but the procedure still involves termination of fetuses
outside the generally approved parameters of legal abortion. It there-
fore remains to be seen if this practice will be challenged.
Feticide laws may have implications in still more areas, for exam-
ple in the private lives of pregnant women generally. If courts can
prohibit a pregnant woman from ingesting drugs or alcohol because it
endangers her fetus, then presumably they could also forbid her from
engaging in sexual activity or jogging for the same reason,194 and func-
tion as a pregnancy police of sorts.195 Likewise, beyond prohibiting
conduct, if the law recognizes the fetus as a person, could the fetus
then count as an extra person in a car pool lane? 19 6 Could parents
who are expecting a child claim him/her on their tax returns? Thus,
while feticide laws address a serious problem, their future to establish
191. See Frances A. McMorris, Courts are Giving New Rights to Fetuses, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 1996, at B1.
192. See David P.T. Price, Selective Reduction and Feticide: The Parameters of Abortion,
1988 CRIM. L. REv. 199.
193. See id. at 202. "Morbidity and mortality are increased in both mother and baby in
multiple pregnancy. The mother faces a greater risk of developing polyhydramniosis (ex-
cessive amniotic fluid), pre-eclampsia, hypertension, hemorrhage and a complicated la-
bour." Id. at 204-05.
194. Granted, there is a distinction in terms of the level of risk involved.
195. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Consti-
tutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 613 (1986).
196. Some courts have already rejected this argument. See Tamar Lewin, Detention of
Pregnant Woman For Drug Use is Struck Down, N.Y. TiMas, Apr. 23, 1997, at A16.
limits on how far a state may go in treating a fetus like a person could
create a slippery slope of unexpected consequences.
Part V: Proposed Fetal Homicide Statute
Feticide laws should be separately enacted and should not be in-
cluded in general homicide statutes because of a fetus' inherent fragil-
ity and the difficulty in proving causation. They should also require
knowledge and intent to kill the fetus, making them consistent with
other homicide statutes and obviating due process problems of notice
to the defendant. Moreover, feticide should not be made part of fel-
ony-murder, in order to ensure that a defendant knows of the exist-
ence of the fetus and specifically intended to kill it.
The following model feticide statute would protect fetal life and
pregnant women from criminal assault, yet vitiate the constitutional
concerns of many feticide law critics, through its requirement of spe-
cific intent.
Model Feticide Act
A bill to define certain crimes against human fetuses, to prescribe
penalties for such offenses and to allow certain exemptions.
197
Sec. 1 If a person knows or has reason to know that a woman is
pregnant and maliciously or recklessly injures that woman by
committing or attempting to commit a crime and that injury re-
sults in a miscarriage or serious physical injury to the fetus, the
person is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned by not more
than fifteen years. The imprisonment prescribed by this section is
in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the un-
derlying crime or attempt to commit the crime.
(a) "Serious physical injury to the fetus" means an injury to
the fetus' physical condition that results in or is likely to re-
sult in substantial bodily disfigurement to or seriously im-
pairs the function of a body organ or limb of the child that
develops from the fetus.
(b) As used in this act, "fetus" means the unborn offspring
of a human being at the second trimester of fetal develop-
ment or thereafter, i.e., the fetus is at least twelve weeks old.
Sec. 2 "Maliciously" means any of the following:
(a) With the intent to cause the death of the fetus or the
fetus' mother
(b) With the intent to cause serious physical injury to the
fetus or the fetus' mother
197. Portions of this proposed model feticide act are excerpted from Michigan's Senate
Bill 515, "The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act" and Michigan's House Bill 5531, also
known as the Baird Alternative to Senate Bill 515, taken from Kende, supra note 144, at
263-65.
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(c) In willful or reckless disregard of the likelihood that the
natural tendency of the assault, infliction of injury, or other
action taken will be to cause the death of, or serious physical
injury to, the fetus or the fetus' mother.
Sec. 3
(a) Feticide as defined herein shall not be deemed murder
for purposes of the felony-murder rule.
(b) Capital punishment shall not be imposed.
Sec. 4 Exemptions. This act does not apply to any of the
following:
(a) An act committed by the mother of the fetus
(b) Good faith performance of medical practice. A medical
procedure performed by a physician or other licensed medi-
cal professional at the request of the mother of a fetus or the
mother's legal guardian or the lawful dispensation or admin-
istration of lawfully prescribed medication.
(c) An act committed in lawful self-defense or defense of an-
other, or which is otherwise legally justified or excused.
Part VI: Conclusion
Fetal homicide regulation/criminalization varies among the states.
Although critics argue that the laws are inconsistent with the right to
abortion, legal abortion and protection for fetuses from criminal as-
sault by third parties can coexist, as abortion and feticide are not sy-
nonymous. With legal abortion, the courts balance a woman's right to
procreative choice with the state's interest in protecting potential life.
Criminal assailants, on the other hand, have no protectable interest in
killing the fetus of a woman who wants to carry it to term. Thus, pro-
tecting fetal life with feticide statutes need not undermine abortion
rights, particularly if the statutes explicitly exempt abortion of the fe-
tus by the pregnant woman and her doctor. Rather, feticide statutes
cannot only punish the assailant for the criminal behavior, but actually
protect the woman's procreative choice as well. Thus, fetal homicide
laws, a growing trend among state legislatures, achieve the desirable
social goals of punishing violent assaults, preserving a woman's pro-
creative choice, protecting the potential life of the fetus, and curbing
domestic violence, drunk driving, and even child abuse where the
pregnant woman is very young.
Yet lost in all the legal wrangling over the status of a fetus are the
voices of those who have lost their unborn children and grandchildren.
No monetary compensation or jail sentence for the defendant can al-
leviate the sense of loss or bring back the life of an expected child.
Nothing can console a woman who has become sterile due to her in-
jury, forever barring her from ever having any children. Who can un-
derstand the loss of a child never born as the parents look at their
baby's room, filled with tiny sleepers, booties, bottles, diapers, a crib,
a car seat, and baby toys?198
198. See Delsite, supra note 177, at Fl.
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